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An Error in Temporal Error Theory.1 
 
Abstract 
Within the philosophy of time there has been a growing interest in positions that deny the reality of time. 
Those positions, whether motivated by arguments from physics or metaphysics, have a shared 
conclusion: time is not real. What has not been made wholly clear, however, is exactly what it entails to 
deny the reality of time. Time is unreal, sure. But what does that mean? 
 
There has (within the recent literature) been only one sustained attempt to spell out exactly what it would 
mean to endorse a (so-called) temporal error theory; a theory that denies the reality of time—Baron & 
Miller’s ‘What is temporal error theory?’. Despite the fact that their paper makes significant strides in 
spelling out what would be required of a temporal error theory, my claim in this paper is that their 
position must be rejected and replaced. As well as looking to reject Baron and Miller’s position, I also 
look to provide that replacement.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
Recently, a number of arguments have been brought forward to motivate and defend positions that deny 
the reality of time (Barbour, 1994a, b, 1999; Barbour and Isham 1999; Baron and Miller 2014; Deutsch 
1997; Roveli 2004, 2007, 2009; Tallant 2008). These arguments have been developed from a range of 
concerns in physics and metaphysics. Following Baron and Miller (B&M) (2015: 2428), call such positions 
‘temporal error theories’. Still following B&M, we should note that little has been said about quite what it 
takes for a view to be properly regarded as a temporal error theory. To date, only B&M have looked to 
provide us with a sustained attempt to spell out how to understand what it would be for a view to be 
temporally error theoretic. This is problematic. For any concept, c: if it is claimed that a world is not c-apt 
because the concept c does not apply to the world, then we should be given a clear account of what 
exactly this requires. As B&M (2015: 2428) note prior to offering their analysis, it is not clear in the case 
of time that such an account has been given. This motivates them to offer their account of what a 
temporal error theory requires. It also motivates the current paper; an attempt to reject their account and 
replace it with something else.  
 
I begin with a brief overview of error theories generally and some of the different kinds of error theory 
that we might be searching for in the philosophy of time, before turning my attention to the specifics of 
B&M’s view. I develop three arguments against their position and detail my preferred account. I show 
that it can deal with various paradigmatic cases of the unreality of time and how it recaptures one of 
B&M’s (2015: 2429-31) core concerns: how to explain the widespread resistance to a temporal error 
theory. Thus, even if you don’t find my arguments against B&M’s account persuasive, my account of 
temporal error theory is still ‘in the running’. 
 
To begin, let us back up: what is it to hold an error theory about some domain of discourse, D? Though 
any account will be somewhat controversial, B&M’s (2015) will serve us here. 
 
 “A discourse is error theoretic just in case that discourse is truth-apt and core statements 
asserted by the discourse are false.” (2015: 2428) 
 
                                                     
1 My thanks to the postgraduate work in progress seminar at the University of Sydney for hosting a discussion of this paper, and 
to Kristie Miller and David Ingram for further discussion and comments. I’m also very grateful to the University of Sydney for 
hosting me while I worked on the project. I’m also very grateful to two referees for the Journal of the American Philosophical 
Association for great comments and discussion. They’ve helped the paper enormously. 
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In the temporal case, that suggests a particular account of temporal error theory: 
 
Temporal error theory: “temporal discourse is truth-apt and literally false” (2015: 2428) 
 
I think that it’s fair to say that, generally, the motivation for an error theory in a particular domain of 
discourse will stem from the fact that said domain of discourse at least appears to quantify over entities 
that do not exist, or else that the entities that do exist aren’t arranged in such a way as to preserve our 
intuitive judgements. 
 
In perhaps the most famous case, the moral case, a moral error theory will likely be motivated by the 
thought that at the core of our moral discourse are claims that aim to quantify over moral properties, but 
that said moral properties do not exist.2 In the temporal case, it makes sense to suppose (prima facie) that 
matters will be similar: core elements of our temporal discourse aim to quantify of temporal entities 
(properties, relations, times, or what have you), but those entities do not exist. 3 Nonetheless, this is not 
the account developed by B&M. 
 
Before proceeding to the specifics B&M’s account, we require a clarification. In the temporal case (and 
perhaps others), an error theory could come in one of (at least) three flavors: folk error theory, physical 
error theory and metaphysical error theory. This follows from the fact that ‘the folk’, metaphysicians and 
physicists may, plausibly, deploy different concepts of time (cf. B&M (2015: 2428)). A physical error 
theory would claim that there is a concept of time defined by its usage in physics, but that it turns out that 
nothing in the world satisfies that concept; a metaphysical error theory would claim that there is a 
concept of time defined by its usage in metaphysics, but that it turns out that nothing in the world 
satisfies that concept; a folk error theory would claim that there is a concept of time defined by its usage 
by ‘the folk’, but that there is nothing in the world that satisfies that concept. Gaining clarity on how 
these error theories would connect to one another is a difficult task. Thankfully, it is also not one that we 
need to engage in here.  
 
Like B&M (2015: 2429) I will focus on folk-error theory. As they have it: 
 
While it would be interesting to discover that an error theory about physical or metaphysical time is 
true it is not obvious that this would have the same ramifications for our ordinary ways of 
understanding ourselves and our role in the world, and it is primarily these ramifications in which we 
are interested. (2015: 2429) 
 
Folk-temporal error theory (‘error theory’ hereafter, as we narrow our focus) has proven remarkably 
unpopular. B&M, in the course of looking to determine what temporal error theory is, look to diagnose 
the cause of this unpopularity. They identify two causes. First, they claim (2015: 2430), we conceive of 
ourselves as agents and this requires that we: (i) persist through time, (ii) are causally efficacious; (iii) are 
capable of instituting change in the world. Second (2015: 2430-1), our temporal phenomenology 
convinces us of the reality of time (where by ‘temporal phenomenology’ they mean to include a range of 
experiences; of succession, of memory, and, perhaps, even of passage). 
 
                                                     
2 Though they needn’t be motivated in this way. If one thought that the moral facts/properties weren’t arranged in the right way 
to preserve the truth of our moral discourse, then that would suffice for the truth of a moral error theory.  
3 To be clear, whatever the motivations for a putative temporal error theory in fact turn out to be, I’m not going to pursue any 
specific arguments for a temporal error theory, here. My concern—as was B&M’s—is with what it takes to hold a temporal error 
theory. 
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2. What is their account? 
B&M are focused on the claim that agency and our experience of time are crucial to time’s being real. 
Having already identified Temporal Error Theory (TET) as it’s described above, they move to examine a 
folk error theory and suggest that, to understand folk error theory, we identify a functional role played by 
time—the ‘timeF role’. In doing so, they move past TET into something rather different. We’ll return to 
this in a moment. 
 
If there is some element of the actual world that plays that functional role, there is then the further 
question of whether what realises that functional role does so rigidly; whether the reality of time at a 
world depends upon it having the same role-realiser that we find at the actual world, or whether that role 
may be realised in other ways at other worlds. B&M take no stand, giving two different criteria: one rigid, 
one non-rigid. The first allows that whatever fulfils the timeF role, does so rigidly.  
 
Rigid timeF: Necessarily, timeF is whatever it is, R, that is tracked by our actual temporal 
phenomenology such that R possesses certain minimal features, F, which include features that are 
necessary for the existence of causation, persistence and change. (2015: 2435) 
 
If, however, we do not take the actual role realiser to be required at every world at which time is real, then 
we can opt for the less modally stringent: 
 
 
Non-rigid timeF: For any world w,F in w is whatever it is, R, that is tracked by temporal 
phenomenology in w, if there is any, so long as R has certain minimal features, F, that include 
features that are necessary for the existence of causation, persistence and change, or if there is no 
temporal phenomenology in w, timeF is whatever it is that has certain minimal features, F, that 
include features that are necessary for the existence of causation, persistence and change. (2015: 
2435) 
 
 
If we endorse rigid-timeF, then the folk temporal error theory will be true at a world w just in case either 
nothing actually plays the time role, or whatever plays the time-role at the actual world does not play that 
role at w (2015: 2435). In contrast, if we endorse Non-rigid timeF, then a world, w, will be one that is 
temporal error-theoretic just in case nothing plays the time-roleF in w (2015: 2436). 
 
We can illustrate both. Start with Rigid-timeF. Suppose our experience of time were purely illusory. In that 
case, temporal error theory would be true of the actual world. Suppose, instead, that the actual world is 
A-theoretic, such that our experience of time is due to the passage of the A-properties, past, present and 
future, and that it is this same passage of A-properties that gives rise to the features of the world required 
for agency (persistence, causation, the capacity to change the world, etc.). Now consider a world, w, that 
is not A-theoretic. Given rigid-timeF, w is a world at which time is not real. In contrast, Non-rigid timeF 
allows that time may still be real at w, just so long as there is some feature of reality that is such that it 
underpins temporal phenomenology and the existence of causation, persistence and change.  
 
Last, note that both accounts include the claim that playing the time role requires the inclusion of certain 
features that are necessary for the existence of causation, persistence and change. What are these features? 
As B&M explain (2015: 2432), it’s hard to be certain. However, they say that that our temporal 
phenomenology must track that which plays the timeF role, and that, ‘we can say with some confidence 
that whatever plays the timeF role must (at least) be capable of supporting timeful phenomena’ (2015: 
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2432), where phenomena may be regarded as ‘timeful’ just in case they can only occur in the presence of 
time. 
 
They then go on (2015: 2432-3): 
 
In order to adequately support the timeful phenomena just mentioned, timeF should be capable of 
doing (at least) four further things. It should be capable of: (i) rendering sensible an indexical notion 
of ‘now’; (ii) supporting a difference between the past and future; (iii) underscoring the manner in 
which the world displays a past/future asymmetry and (iv) scaffolding the asymmetry of 
counterfactual dependence. 
 
To explain, they seek to show how agency would require at least these four features. Rendering sensible 
an indexical notion of the now is crucial because: ‘[i]n order to deliberate, one needs to now de se facts 
about where one is located in relation to events’ (2015: 2433). A difference between the past and future, 
as well as the demand for a past-future asymmetry, is required because: ‘[w]hen choosing, we act towards 
(what we take to be) the future, and not toward the past’ (2015: 2432-3). The asymmetry of counterfactual 
dependence must be underscored because: ‘agency requires that we be able to make sense of what would 
happen in the future, were we to make certain choices; but not so for what would happen in the past, 
which calls on the very asymmetry at issue’ (2015: 2432-3).  
 
We can summarise: 
 
X plays the time role iff: [A] our temporal phenomenology successfully tracks x and, [B] x 
supports agency, causation, change and persistence, by (at least): (i) rendering sensible an 
indexical notion of ‘now’; (ii) supporting a difference between the past and the future; (iii) 
underscoring the manner in which the world displays a past/future asymmetry and (iv) 
scaffolding the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence. 
 
 
We ought to reject this account. In section 3 I offer up three concerns. The first two centre on the fact 
that we are missing crucial details from B&M (details that they don’t provide; I don’t explore whether 
they could provide them). I also develop one of B&M’s suggested counterexamples and show that their 
position falls foul of it. In section 4 I introduce my preferred account, showing that it deals with each of 
the problems raised in section 3. Later in section 4, I discuss a range of potential concerns. 
 
Before that, though, the preceding discussion might suggest that my original characterisation of B&M’s 
project is not quite fair. To see this, let us step back to the moral case. Let’s imagine (for the sake of 
argument) that everyone agrees that moral error theory is true if there are no moral properties.  
We made a choice just there. We focused on whether there are moral properties. We did not ask, ‘what 
does it take for there to be moral properties?’. 
 
And that might be important. Someone might think that there are moral properties iff (insert your 
preferred theory here), while someone else might contend that if that is all there is, then there are no 
moral properties. 
 
One could then offer two quite different, but compatible, accounts of error theory: 
 
(a) Moral error theory is true, iff there are no moral properties  
 
(b) Moral error theory is true, iff there are no properties that do the following things (insert a 
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suitable description here). 
 
(a) and (b) are doing two quite different jobs.  (a) is telling us that if moral error theory is to be true, then 
it is because there are no moral properties. Fully specified, (b) is (or would be) telling us what it would be, 
to be a moral property, and denying anything does that. 
 
There is an analogue with the temporal case. Temporal error theory is true iff 
 
(a)* there are no temporal properties 
 
or  
 
(b)*  there are no properties that do the following things  
 
And here, for B&M, ‘following things’ would mean: are tracked by our temporal phenomenology, and 
support agency, causation, change and persistence. 
 
And we might take B&M to be providing an account like b* in response to the question: what would it 
take for there to be temporal properties or relations? 
 
I’m uncertain of their intentions, but I think that there is a troubling tension in their position if B&M are 
taken to be asking the latter question. Simply, it's not clear (at least on the face of it) why being tracked by 
our temporal phenomenology, and supporting agency, causation, change and persistence would be 
necessary in order for there to be temporal properties or relations. By way of example: it would seem 
plausible enough to suppose that if we denied that objects persisted (and thereby endorsed the position 
sketched by Tallant (2014) as ‘delta nihilism’), time may still be real and time would not be any different 
from the way that we thought of it. To be sure, nothing persists through time on such a model, but that’s 
not to say that time itself is at all peculiar or in any way other than we naturally suppose. So we are not (or 
so I will assume from here on) interested in the question of what it would be for there to be temporal 
properties, but in the question of whether there are such properties and whether they are arranged as we 
might expect.  
 
 
3. Missing details and potential demons 
Let me now turn to three concerns with B&M’s account.  
 
3.1 ‘Successful tracking’ 
B&M require that whatever plays the time role is successfully tracked by our temporal phenomenology. 
How closely must our temporal phenomenology track x to be regarded as ‘successfully’ tracking x, if x is 
to play the time role? There are plenty of cases where our temporal phenomenology fails to track 
properly.  
 
First, as Fraisse (1984) notes, in laboratory conditions subjects will judge stimuli separated by less than 
100ms to be simultaneous with one another. If x is simultaneous with y, then it's not the case that x is 
either earlier than or later than y. Thus, our temporal phenomenology is such that we systematically 
misrepresent as simultaneous events that occur +/-100ms before or after one another. In point of fact, 
that's a lot of error. It's also a systematic error. A lot of events occur within 100ms of one another. 
Nonetheless, no-one has ever claimed--nor do I think that they should claim--on this basis that time is not 
real, or that this gives us grounds to adopt a temporal error theory. 
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Second, consider cases drawn from the perception literature, commonly described as featuring in the 
'time gap argument'. We regularly ‘see’ objects that did exist, but that do so no longer--distant stars being 
an excellent case in point. Our temporal phenomenology is of such entities being present. But now-
burned-out stars are not present. They are past. They exist no more. And it's easy to see that, although the 
case is most extreme when we consider now-burned-out stars, the point is independent of it. Our 
phenomenology is as-of non-present entities being present. This is a systematic and widespread error. 
Nonetheless, once again, no one has ever claimed—nor do I think that they should claim—on this basis 
that time is not real or that we should adopt a temporal error theory. 
 
Now, it’s open to B&M to specify some account of what constitutes success. But in the absence of that 
specification, and in the clear presence of a good deal of systematic error in our temporal 
phenomenology, their account can reasonably be regarded as omitting an important detail. I do not take 
this to be an insuperable problem. But I do think that some account needs to be forthcoming and I am at 
a slight loss as to see a way forward. What will we say? That for X to play the time role, our temporal 
phenomenology must track X in more than 50% of cases? Does a 49% error rate constitute success? That 
seems a remarkably unsuccessful rate to me; it’s basically the same as mere chance. Would 63% be 
sufficient? What about 62.5%? Further, does the overall tracking rate matter, provided we track particular 
types of experience? Would it be ok if we were to always misjudge the simultaneity (or otherwise) of events 
separated by less than 100ms, as long as we get everything else right? I don’t know and don’t see a clear, 
principled route forward. 
 
I concede that, to an extent, this challenge seems a little unfair. In some sense spelling out ‘successful 
tracking’ could be seen as everyone’s job: realist and error theorist alike. The same point can be applied to 
the moral case. Per the introduction of error theories in section 1, we said that a view may be thought 
error theoretic just in case either the domain of discourse at least appears to quantify over entities that do 
not exist, or else that the entities that do exist aren’t arranged in such a way as to preserve our intuitive 
judgements. The latter disjunct surely can’t be read as requiring that all of our intuitive (moral or 
temporal) judgments are preserved. So, how many are required? Just one? Half? Who knows! And so, 
against that that backdrop, surely B&M can’t be expected to provide a totally precise definition of 
“successful tracking”. It’s a vague notion, to be sure, but a notion that’s regularly appealed to. 
 
I don’t want to over-state the concern. Nonetheless, I’ve identified above some pretty systematic and 
widespread errors in our temporal phenomenology. There’s simply a lot of error. So, whilst I agree that in 
perfectly general terms, spelling out what it takes for successful tracking to occur is difficult, and plausibly 
everyone faces a similar problem, with so many errors in our phenomenology, it seems pressing that 
B&M say at least a little more about successful tracking, else it become unclear how to properly understand 
their view. 
 
3.2 Circular time? 
A world at which circular time exists is one at which time is real (and is non-error-theoretic), but this is 
not the verdict returned by B&M. Roughly, to say that time is circular, rather than linear, is to say that it 
has a circular topology. It appears open as to whether the actual world exhibits a linear temporal 
structure, or whether the topology is circular, such that every time-like separated event is both earlier and 
later than every other time-like separated event (in what we might call a ‘Big-Bounce’ model (see, eg., 
Gielen and Turok (2016)). Suppose, as seems epistemically possible, that the topology is circular. Add to 
this that such a circular topology includes causal loops, such that it is true to say that events immediately 
preceding a collapse can be said to be the cause of the collapse, and that the collapse can be said to be the 
cause of the expansion, etc. How does this fare against B&M’s criteria? 
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The temporal structure that existed would be that which is tracked by our temporal phenomenology. 
However, it’s not clear that a circular temporal topology satisfies each of the other requirements. For 
instance, if time is circular, then agents cannot sensibly take the future to be different from the past. As 
Dowden puts it: ‘[i]f any part of time were circular, then the future—at least this part of it—is also the 
past, and every event in that part occurs before itself.’ More, since any action performed is just as much 
directed towards the past as it is the future, it is not at all clear that this model underscores a past/future 
asymmetry. Last, it is not at clear that a circular model of time provides us with any scaffolding for the 
asymmetry of counterfactual dependence. Witness the following. It seems just as correct to say that: were 
it not the case that Billy threw the ball, then it would be the case that the window broke, as it would be to 
say that, were it not the case that the window broke, then it would not be the case that Billy threw the 
ball. After all, there is a global symmetry at the world described, and we may also have global causal loops.  
Given B&M’s requirements, that would appear to make circular time not a model of time, at all, and such 
a world temporally error theoretic. But that seems (intuitively) wrong; the folk do recognise circular 
temporal models as being models that preserve the reality of time.  
 
For instance, circular conceptions of time seem to have been held at a significant number of points in 
history (see, eg., Whitrow (1989: 42-3, 46-7, 65)). More recently, and pressingly, there are a number of 
discussions of circular time, ranging from analyses of Nobel-prize winning literature4 (‘The very structure 
of Sun Stone reproduces this pessimistic vision of circular time’), film reviews5 (“Arrival” is brilliantly 
thought-provoking, exploring the circular nature of time,…’), general discussions of whether particular 
religious views are properly judged as committing their proponents to circular time6, and works of 
literature themselves that appear to treat time as circular.7 My point is simply that contemporary writers 
seem able to recognise a circular temporal structure and describe it as time. They do not feel any need to 
claim that such models deny the reality of time; they describe these circular models as models of time. 
This suggests that non-philosophers and non-scientists (something like the folk) do recognise circular 
temporal models as being models of time, rather than models that deny the reality of time, and not as 
temporally error-theoretic scenarios. These at least seem to be cases where there are temporal properties, 
and these are arranged in the kinds of ways we might expect (for ‘the folk’ seem to manage to make sense 
of these scenarios as temporal). 
 
I therefore think that we should regard the folk view of time as being one that is compatible with circular 
time, and I think that it would be good to hear more from B&M about this case. A scenario in which 
there is circular time appears to be one in which the folk regard time is real and ought not to be said to 
hold an error theory. Nonetheless, at least on cursory inspection, that’s not a result B&M’s position 
achieves. It may be possible for B&M to overcome this concern, but then we must be told how. 
 
3.3 Demons & time 
My final objection to B&M’s view is developed from a case they introduce. B&M consider the 
supposition that x may play the time role iff x is tracked by our temporal phenomenology. They say: 
 
Suppose we live in a world in which there is timeF, but our temporal phenomenology is generated 
entirely by an evil demon. Our cognitive states ground our phenomenology, and that 
phenomenology tracks something, but the thing that it tracks is an evil demon, or perhaps some 
                                                     
4 https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/themes/literature/cullhed/  
5 https://wtop.com/entertainment/2016/11/review-arrival-is-masterful-science-fiction-until-vexing-twist/ 
6 https://www.algemeiner.com/2017/05/07/new-york-times-erroneously-claims-jewish-time-is-circular/ 
7 See, or instance, ‘Night Broadcast’ by Ion Hobana in which a signal from the past is detected by a gadget that is geared up to 
detect future transmissions. ‘By going far enough into the future one comes upon what we call the past’. 
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phenomenon created by that demon. In this case, though our phenomenology tracks something, 
the thing it tracks is not timeF. (B&M, 2015: 2432) 
 
B&M use this case to motivate a move beyond phenomenology. As they then put it: 
 
Thus, roughly, a set of objects, properties and relations, F, jointly plays the timeF role just in case 
F is tracked by our temporal phenomenology and F has certain minimal features, including 
features that are necessary for the existence of change, causation and persistence, where what it is 
to support timeful phenomena is, in part, to support indexicality, directionality, asymmetric 
counterfactuals and so on. This second condition rules out that an evil demon counts as being 
timeF even if the demon is what is tracked by our temporal phenomenology, because (at a minimum) evil demons 
are not necessary for the existence of timeful phenomena. (2015: 2433-2434—my italics) 
 
However, reflection on another case suggests this isn’t right. 
 
Consider a B-theoretic, eternalist world, at which many events exist and at which each event stands in 
fixed and permanent ‘earlier than’ and ‘later than’ (so-called B-) relations to every other event.  Were we 
to inhabit this world, then it seems reasonable to say that this B-theoretic relational structure would 
underpin indexicality, directionality, asymmetric counterfactuals, and also be that which is tracked by our 
temporal phenomenology. This structure looks as if it will play the time role. 
 
Back to the demons. Suppose that the only inhabitants of this world are in thrall to a demon; it is the 
demon that is tracked by their temporal phenomenology. One way to conceptualise this is that at every 
moment, the demon generates in all of the inhabitants of the world all of their life experiences and 
presents these in such a fashion that it appears to the inhabitants that they are moving through time in 
just the same way that it seems to us that we are moving through time. Thus, at each moment every 
inhabitant of the world in question appears (to themselves) to have a complete life-time of experiences 
and it appears (falsely) to each inhabitant that these experiences are spread out over time. This is all, 
however, the work of the demon; the demon misleads them both about the events that will constitute 
their life, as well as the temporal separation between these events. Nonetheless, the demon is actually 
doing a good job of preserving the illusion of the reality of time. In these illusions, night seems to follow 
day. It appears that there is counterfactual asymmetry. It appears that time has a direction. Indeed, were 
folks released they’d have no problem at all in navigating the temporal world around them. This demon, 
though changing out the actual events that constitute the history of the world, otherwise creates a world 
that appears to the inhabitants of the illusion much as it would were they not in the grips of the demon’s 
schemes.  
 
Notice that in this scenario there exists a B-theoretic structure. This structure includes features that are 
necessary for the existence of change, causation and persistence, where what it is to support timeful 
phenomena is, in part, to support indexicality, directionality, asymmetric counterfactuals. But, because of 
the demon, temporal phenomenology does not track this structure. Temporal phenomenology is 
generated entirely by the demon. By B&M’s lights, time is not real at this world; what we have is an error 
theory. 
 
But this seems wrong. As above, it seems perfectly reasonable to think that this kind of temporal 
structure suffices for the reality of time. There is causation at this world. There is a B-theoretic direction, 
from earlier to later. There are temporally asymmetric counterfactuals. There are true (temporal) indexical 
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propositions (e.g. ‘everyone is now being deceived by a demon’). Moreover, were the demon to disappear, 
or were the demon to have a change of heart and stop generating this temporal phenomenology, then 
temporal phenomenology would track the B-theoretic structure. There seems to be a strong case for 
thinking that time is real at such a world. Something plays the time role (the B-theoretic structure plays 
the time role) despite not underpinning temporal phenomenology.  
 
There might remain a worry. As above, a position can intuitively be regarded temporally error-theoretic if 
either, there are no temporal properties, or if those properties are arranged very differently from the way that we 
supposed. In short: temporal error theory is intuitively true if there are no temporal properties, or if time is 
very different than we supposed. In the demon case, it’s clear there are temporal properties. So, is time as 
we suppose?  
 
I think so. It’s clear enough, from the perspective we occupy, that the external world in this scenario 
would preserve counterfactual dependence, asymmetry, and so on and so forth. So, whilst there might be 
certain intuitive judgements made by the inhabitants of the world that don’t turn out quite right (someone 
in the grip of the illusion might wrongly think that yesterday they ate a peach; they didn’t, they were being 
deceived by a demon), I see no compelling reason to think this scenario is temporally error-theoretic as 
opposed to a case where folks are deceived. That being so, it seems that we have reason to repair or 
replace B&M’s account.8 Since I cannot see how to repair it, I opt for replacement. 
 
4. Revised temporal error theory. 
It’s typical to see a domain of discourse treated as error theoretic just in case that discourse is truth-apt 
and core statements asserted by the discourse are false. 
 
That generates a particular account of temporal error theory: 
 
Temporal error theory (TET): temporal discourse is truth-apt and literally false. 
 
I suggest we stick to temporal error theory as it is stated in TET.  
 
Detail must be added. In particular, what counts as ‘temporal discourse’? For reasons that will become 
apparent, I adopt the position that: the truth, at a world, of non-trivial present-tensed propositions is 
necessary and sufficient for the reality of time.  
 
4.1 TET’s consequences 
First, this solves the problems raised for B&M. The extent to which our temporal phenomenology tracks 
a temporal structure is irrelevant: time is real at world iff there are present-tensed true propositions. It 
doesn’t matter what those propositions are. Circular time presents no difficulty: time is real at a world that 
has a circular temporal topology; there are present tensed truths at such a world. Since a B-theoretic 
world has the resources to make true present tensed propositions, a B-theoretic world will be one at 
which time is real—demon or no demon. TET is off to a promising start.  
 
Second, this delivers the (pleasing) result that all of the main positions in the philosophy of time 
(eternalism, growing block, presentism, etc.) are non-error-theoretic. All of them preserve (or at least seek 
                                                     
8 Nothing of note turns on my choice of the B-theory. Any viable theory would do. The point is simply that a good candidate 
theory for our actual world (e.g. the B-theory) turns out to not play the time role—and so time would not be real—if there is an 
evil demon at that world who engages in the right kind of deceit. That result is a bad one. 
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to preserve; whether they succeed is a matter of at least some debate) the truth of present-tensed claims. 
That’s a good start. 
 
4.2 TET’s consequences: Effingham and Melia 
However, it may seem that TET faces counterexamples. Here I borrow part of a set-up from Effingham 
and Melia (2007: 144). 
 
Given a world containing a manifold of times and containing an object a that bears the charge 
relation to time t, another possible world is generated by cutting away all times but t. In such a 
world, though t remains, it plays none of the roles that are characteristic of being a time. 
Object t bears no temporal relations to other times; there is no temporal dimension at such a 
world so no temporal dimension for t to be a part of; there is no change at such a world so there 
is no dimension of change. Under such extreme conditions, t no longer does anything to deserve 
the name ‘a moment of time’. Yet, by construction, a still bears F to t. Since nothing deserves to 
be called a time at this world, t in particular is not a time at this world. Since a still bears the 
charge relation to t, we have thus reached a world containing something which bears the charge 
relation to something which is not a time. 
 
So, let us test, TET: is t a world at which there are present tensed truths, but at which time is unreal?  
 
Well, to decide that first we must differentiate between two similar scenarios. It is possible (or so I’ll 
assume) for time to be real, but for reality to last for just one instant; it’s also possible for time to be 
unreal. To indulge in a little metaphor: “God created the world and saw to it that it lasted but an instant.” 
“God created the world but created it such there was no time”. Those possibilities seem different and 
absent a reason to think otherwise I submit we treat them such.  
 
What that difference comes to will be difficult to spell out, but the one instant world will have to contain 
some temporal structure. This structure could take different forms. For instance, some A-theorists are 
minded to treat presence as a property.9 Perhaps the difference between a one-instant world and a no-
instant world comes to the fact that the property of presence is instantiated the one-instant world (though 
not at the no-instant world). Or, if we deny that there is such a property perhaps we could maintained 
that, at the one-instant world, every entity stands in a temporal relation to every other (a B-theoretic 
simultaneity relation—albeit a conventional relation of simultaneity—or perhaps we could specify that 
every object resides upon the same Cauchy surface), and differentiate a one-instant world from a no-
instant world by arguing that at the no instant world there is no such structure.  
 
To return to the E&M case, what is unclear is whether t retains any temporal structure. For everything 
E&M say, t seems neutral between a no-instant world and a one-instant world. What matters, I submit, 
will be whether the structure ‘left behind’ after the subtraction described by Effingham and Melia is a 
structure that suffices to make it true, of t, that ‘t is present’. If it does, then there is enough temporal 
structure at t for t to be a one instant world. If it does not, then there is not. But the potential threat from 
their case came from the fact that we had a seemingly timeless world, t, at which there are temporal 
truths. I’ve suggested that it’s an open question as to whether there is temporal structure at t that would 
suffice for there to be temporal truths, and that if there is enough temporal structure at t for there to be 
temporal truths, then t is a one instant world and time is real.  
                                                     
9 For instance, as Markosian (2014) has it: ‘The opponents of The B Theory accept the view (often referred to as “The 
A Theory”) that there are genuine properties such as being two days past, being present, etc.; that facts about these A 
properties are not in any way reducible to facts about B relations.’ 
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Perhaps we can press the question one more time: temporal error theory is true if there are no temporal 
properties, or if time is very different than we supposed. A one-instant world is very different from our 
own, timeful world. So, does that mean that temporal error theory is true of a one instant world, and that 
TET therefore generates the wrong conclusion?  
 
I think not. The central plank of my response is that a one-instant world retains the kind of temporal 
structure that we think exists at the actual world. Granted, we might think at the actual world that there 
are many times, and that at one-instant world, there is only one, but that’s a difference in number rather 
than an interesting difference in kind. To see the relevance of this point, let’s compare with the moral 
case. Consider a possible world that contains just one event: Jones setting fire to a cat. Let us grant that, 
at this world, there also exists a moral fact—Jones setting fire of the cat is wrong. We should conclude that 
moral realism is true of such a world. Of course, there are no other events, so there is only one moral fact. 
But the moral property that exists is instantiated in the right kind of way. (In contrast, we might be 
tempted to say that moral error theory would be true of a world if the moral property that existed was 
such that the setting fire to the cat is good.) To be sure, there is only one moral fact at this world and so 
the world is, morally, very different from our own. But so be it. The property of wrongness attaches to the 
world as we would expect. Moral error theory does not apply here. 
 
I think the same basic point applies to the temporal case. Granted, a one instant world is very different to 
our own—just as different as a one-event/one moral fact world is. Nonetheless, and I take this to be the 
key point—what temporal structure there is is arranged at this world in such a way as to match our 
expectations of how that world should be. There is one moment. For its duration, it is present. That’s 
pretty much all that we can expect of it. (Were that moment always past, for instance, then matters might 
be otherwise.) That being so, this is a world where temporal error theory does not apply. Thus, I see no 
reason to think that an E&M style case threatens TET. 
 
 
4.3 TET’s consequences: why the present tensed truths? 
Let us return to the details of TET. Why pick the present-tensed truths? Well, as we’ve just seen, a one 
instant world looks to be one at which time is real, but it is not clear to me that any temporal truths other 
than present tensed truths are true at such a world. Were we to focus our attention on any other temporal 
truths, it’s hard to see how we can secure the result that a one instant world is one at which time is real. 
 
In response, an objector might claim that the present tensed truths are sufficient for the reality of time, 
but not necessary for the reality of time. Just so long as we have some other temporal truths, then it 
follows that time is real. 
 
To this concern, I reply as follows. Given a standard Priorean (2003) gloss, the present tense operator ‘it’s 
now the case that…’ is redundant. When we utter sentences like ‘it is raining’ we do nothing to effect the 
truth value or meaning of the sentence by adding ‘now’ to the sentence. 
 
Suppose that’s correct. Now consider any temporal expression—indeed, any expression at all if we take 
‘the redundancy of the now’ seriously. It follows from that any sentence should be read as equivalent to 
that self-same sentence embedded within the scope of a present tense operator: p is equivalent to Np. If 
that’s right, the truth of any temporal proposition is equivalent to (and entails) a present-tensed 
proposition. So, as long as we have any true temporal proposition, then a present-tensed proposition is 
true. And, in that case, it’s hard to see how to maintain that the truth of a present tensed proposition 
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could fail to be necessary for the reality of time if we’re opting for something like TET. Thus, if ‘now’ is a 
redundant operator, then my interpretation of TET will be viable. 
 
4.4 TET’s consequences: can we explain the lure? 
One issue that B&M raise is the need to give an explanation for the fact that arguments against the reality 
of time receive such a bad reception. In their terms: 
 
Though both McTaggart (1908) and Gödel (1949) have argued for an error theory about time, 
their arguments have typically failed to convince. That there is something in our world that is a 
good enough deserver to satisfy the concept of time typically seems more certain to us than any 
philosopher’s argument to the contrary. There are relatively few things we could discover about 
our world that would lead us to conclude that there is no time, rather than to conclude that time 
is somewhat different to how we had supposed. Call this phenomenon relative ineliminability. 
(B&M, 2015: 2429-30) 
 
B&M go on to explain that we ordinarily think it likely that there exist various phenomena that require 
the reality of time: specifically, causation, persistence and change. Further, we also think it likely that there 
are particular phenomena—‘agential phenomena’—that also seem to require the reality of time, where that 
should be taken to include planning for the future, holding agents responsible for their past actions, etc. 
So, in giving a functional account of the reality of time in the way that they do, B&M’s position entails 
that if time is unreal, then that this is so is precisely because the requisite structure (whatever that may be) 
to support causation, agency, phenomenology of passage, etc., isn’t present. Of course, if those features 
aren’t present in a timeless world, then it’s hard to accept that our world is timeless, for we are (claim 
B&M) committed to the existence of these phenomena. 
 
I concede that the relative ineliminability of time is an oddity and that it requires an explanation. Happily, 
TET delivers an explanation. Consider, very generally, that error theories are hard to swallow. Moral error 
theory has us deny that there are moral truths. Error theory about composite objects (mereological 
nihlism) has us deny that there are composite objects. An error theory about the mental (eliminative 
materialism) has us deny that there are such things as thoughts. But, as I’ve described it, temporal error 
theory would be as bad as all of those error theories combined. After all, each of the following sentences 
are plausibly present tensed: ‘you should not kill him’, ‘my computer is on the desk’, ‘I think I should go 
home’. If TET were true of the actual world, none of those sentences would be true. All of those 
sentences would be truth apt, but, because they are present tensed, they would also be false. That’s 
incredibly hard to accept. 
 
Indeed, the same will be true about a whole host of other judgements, a sub-set of which enable us to 
recover B&M’s own explanation for why theories that deny the reality of time have proven objectionable. 
Consider the following sentences: ‘I’m breaking up the jigsaw puzzle’, ‘I’m going out with Hilary again’, 
‘I’m breaking in these new shoes’. These sentences are present-tensed. They make claims that are causal 
(the breaking of the puzzle and the breaking in of the new shoes), require persistence (else how could I go 
out with Hilary again?) and change (again, the puzzle and the shoes). But, since those sentences are 
present tensed, any theory satisfying TET would be obliged to treat those sentences as truth-apt, but 
false. 
 
Now, if we were agents, then these sentences would be true. If they are not true, then we are not, in fact, 
agents. If a theory satisfying TET is true, then we are not agents. Since we are committed to the idea of 
ourselves as agents (B&M, 2015: 2430), so this goes some way to explaining the relative ineliminability of 
the reality of time. Denying the reality of time means denying that there are present-tensed truths. And 
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that means denying that there are such phenomena as causation, agency and the phenomenology of 
passage. And that’s just too much to swallow. 
 
4.5 TET is unsatisfying and prone to counterexamples 
Temporal error theory, as I present it, is fully captured by TET. But whilst that may be a good starting 
point, it doesn’t really tell us anything about what it would take to falsify temporal discourse. We don’t 
know what is required to make temporal discourse true or false. At least, so goes the concern. Further, 
this omission makes possible two different kinds of counterexample: counterexamples that threaten both 
the necessity and sufficiency of TET. 
The threat to necessity: suppose that we adopt a token-reflexive account of the truth-conditions for 
present-tensed claims.10 Accordingly, a token of "it is now 10pm" is true iff that token is located at 10pm. 
For any world in which there are no present-tensed sentence tokens, there will be no true present-tensed 
statements. So, consider an eternalist world that is just like ours and, via recombination, ‘strip it’ of all 
linguistic tokens of this kind. Such a world is not a world in which time is real. That seems like the wrong 
result. This tokenless world contains just the same temporal structure as the original. All that has changed 
is whether there are any sentences of the ‘right’ kind. The reality of time doesn’t depend on that. 
The threat to sufficiency: in Barbour's (1999) theory, all that exists is a single 3-dimensional configuration-
--a time-capsule---that contains very many consistent records indicating a temporal history, but a history 
that doesn't actually exist. There is no reason why there couldn't be present-tensed propositions in this 
time-capsule (perhaps in a book), but, we may worry, there is no reason to take this world as one in which 
time is real. According to Barbour, there is no temporal structure. 
What both cases share is that, because of TET, the temporal truths are doing all of the work. What has 
not been said is how these truths are to ‘connect up’ to the world. For, or so goes the thought, if a world 
is to be regarded as timeless, what matters isn’t just what’s true at such a world, what matters is what 
those truths are representing (or failing to represent). Thus, what matters in the threat to necessity isn’t 
whether there are tensed truths. What matters is whether those truths are representing temporal structure. 
The problem is that TET doesn’t say that, and so TET fails to recognise that the world described is one 
which time is real.  
 
Similarly, in the threat to sufficiency, what matters isn’t whether we can cook up a true sentence, what 
matters is what would be represented by such a sentence. And, in this case, it’s clear that no temporal 
sentence should be true at such a world, because it lacks all temporal structure. There is no temporal 
structure to be represented by a putative truth; thus we should regard such a world as timeless. 
 
I think these two threats (to necessity and sufficiency) require different treatments. Dealing with the 
threat to necessity requires me to clarify what I mean by ‘temporal discourse’. Dealing with the threat to 
sufficiency requires me to take a slightly different route. I’ll deal with each case in turn. 
 
I say that time is unreal just in case temporal discourse is truth apt and false. Two things then need 
clarifying. When I say that ‘temporal discourse is truth apt and false’ I am being imprecise. More carefully, 
TET is the claim that: Temporal discourse is truth apt and false, or, if there is no temporal discourse at a 
world, then had there been such discourse, then it would have been false. I take it, of course, that the 
same is true of most anti-realist views. For instance, I do not think that we ought to object to moral anti-
                                                     
10 Cf. Dyke (2002; 2003). 
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realism that the view is false because there are possible worlds that lack mind independent moral facts but 
that also lack agents who engage in moral discourse. Moral anti-realism is true in the absence of such 
facts.  Any argument to the contrary seems to deliberately miss the point of the anti-realist’s position. So, 
though TET is accurate enough for us to be going on with we can offer the more precise version if 
required. 
 
The threat from sufficiency requires a different response. The concern is that unless we say something 
about what temporal truths require of the world, then it looks open that a tensed proposition might be 
true at a Barbour style world. That’s just wrong.  
 
I offer a two-step response. The first step is a clarification: I take for granted that what I mean by 
‘temporal truths’ carries with it a commitment to a theory of truth that is robustly realist: for a 
proposition to be true requires that it is true in virtue of how the (mind-independent, verification 
transcendent) world is—however we are then to spell out this ‘in virtue of’ claim. In saying as much, I do 
not mean to commit myself to any particular theory of truth or any particular theory of what it is that 
underpins this ‘in virtue of’. Nonetheless, I do presuppose that true propositions are true because of how 
the world is. 
 
The second step, an explanation, follows from this clarification. Suppose, per the objection, that we had 
true present-tensed propositions at a Barbour world, in virtue of a Barbourian 3D capsule. Here will bite 
the bullet. If this 3D capsule is such as to make true present tensed propositions, then contra the received 
wisdom, I would regard time as real at the capsule world. Let me try to explain. 
 
First, remember that we are holding fixed the claim that a proposition is true in virtue of how the world is 
(however that ‘in virtue of’ is to be spelled out). Second, we should remind ourselves that, even granting a 
realist theory of truth, it does not need to follow that the (seeming) linguistic structure of the 
representational device is mirrored by the world. That is, that it is true to say of some time that ‘it is now’, 
or that we say that ‘x is later than y’ does not mean that the world must contain a property of nowness or 
a later than relation. What makes true a claim that ‘a is F’ or that ‘Rxy’ can be other than a, F, R, x and y.11 
So, we needn’t suppose that temporal truths are true in virtue of temporal structure in the world. Third, 
let me compare the temporal case with some more familiar cases. So, holding fixed a realist theory of 
truth, let us think about modality. Our question: should we be realists about possibility? Our test is 
possibility error theory, PET: modal discourse is truth-apt and literally false. In this case, ‘modal 
discourse’ amounts to putative truths such as ‘it’s possible for birds to fly’ and ‘I could eat a sandwich’. If 
claims such as these are true, I don’t think that we can deny the reality of possibility. Next, consider the 
moral case. Our test is moral error theory, MET: moral discourse is truth-apt and literally false. In this 
case, ‘moral discourse’ amounts to putative truths like ‘it is wrong to steal’, and ‘it is good to give to 
charity’. If claims such as these are true, I do not think that we can deny the reality of morality.  
 
So, if present tensed claims are true, and if we endorse a realism about truth, then time is real. The 
question then becomes whether or not anything in the Barbour-world is such that temporal propositions 
are true at such a world. I do not propose to settle that issue, here, but I do think that how we settle the 
matter determines whether we should think of a Barbour world as one at which time is real or unreal.12 
 
                                                     
11 For a mundane example: nominalists deny that there are properties, but will typically say that it’s true that, for instance, my cup 
is blue. 
12 B&M cannot preserve this result. There is no temporal asymmetry at a Barbour world and so, by their lights, time is not real. 
However, if what exists at a Barbour world suffices to make it true that, for some x, <x is present> is true, then, for the reasons 
given, I think their view fails. 
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Finally, an objector might claim that we still don’t really know what temporal error theory is. We’ve not 
been told what it would take, given a robust account of truth, for a present tensed truth to be true. So, 
even in a Barbour-world, we don’t really know whether that’s temporally error-theoretic. 
 
To this objector I suggest that this is a case in which this is actually the desired result. It can be a 
legitimate matter of disagreement whether the world’s being thus and so, is sufficient to make some moral 
claim true (i.e. whether people having mental states of certain kinds is a truthmaker for moral claims); 
likewise in the modal case. But that shouldn’t get in the way of us spelling out a general account of moral 
and modal error theory. TET is neutral on such issues, just as MET is.  
 
One can legitimately disagree about whether the world’s being as Barbour describes it, would be sufficient 
to make true, present-tensed sentences/propositions and one can ask whether there is enough structure at 
a Barbour-world for time to be considered real. TET is merely a test—and a good one—to help us along 
the way. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
Arguments that move from our best physics to the claim that time isn’t real, are ubiquitous. What such 
arguments do not make at all clear is what, exactly, such claims amount to. We now have a grip on what a 
theory must do in order to deny the reality of time. 
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